Optimal Sovereign Default

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Adam, Klaus; Grill, Michael
• 署名单位: University of Mannheim; University of Vienna
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MACROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7707
• DOI: 10.1257/mac.20140093
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 128-164
• 关键词: optimal maturity; monetary-policy; fiscal-policy; debt; repudiation

摘要

When is it optimal fora fully committed government to default on its legal repayment obligations? Considering a small open economy with domestic production risk and noncontingent government debt, we show that it is ex ante optimal to occasionally deviate from the legal repayment obligation and to repay debt only partially. This holds true even if default generates significant deadweight costs ex post. A quantitative analysis reveals that default is optimal only in response to persistent disaster-like shocks to domestic output. Applying the framework to the situation in Greece, we find that optimal default policies suggest a considerably larger and more timely default than the one actually implemented in the year 2012.