Underemployment and the Trickle-Down of Unemployment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Barnichon, Regis; Zylbergberg, Yanos
• 署名单位: Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - San Francisco; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); University of Bristol
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MACROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7707
• DOI: 10.1257/mac.20160220
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 40-78
• 关键词: equilibrium unemployment; heterogeneous jobs; cyclical behavior; matching model; search; overeducation; assignment; VACANCIES; mismatch; COSTS

摘要

A substantial fraction of workers are underemployed, i.e., employed in jobs for which they are overqualified, and that fraction-the underemployment rate is higher in recessions. To explain these facts, we build a search model with an endogenous ranking mechanism, in which high-skill applicants are systematically hired over less-skilled competing applicants. Some high-skill workers become underemployed in order to escape the competition for high-skill jobs and find a job more rapidly at the expense of less-skilled workers. Quantitatively, the model can capture the key characteristics of underemployment, notably the fact that both the underemployment rate and the wage loss associated with becoming underemployed increase in recessions.