Bubbly Recessions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Biswas, Siddhartha; Hanson, Andrew; Phan, Toan
• 署名单位: University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Richmond
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MACROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7707
• DOI: 10.1257/mac.20180083
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 33-70
• 关键词: Asset bubbles; financial frictions; endogenous growth; wage rigidity; MODEL; debt; constraints; policies

摘要

We develop a tractable bubbles model with financial friction and downward wage rigidity. Competitive speculation in risky bubbles can result in excessive investment booms that precede inefficient busts, where -post-bubble aggregate economic activities collapse below the -pre-bubble trend. Risky bubbles can reduce ex ante social welfare, and leaning-against-the-bubble policies that balance the boom-bust-trade-off can be warranted. We further show that the collapse of a bubble can push the economy into a secular stagnation equilibrium, where the zero lower bound and the nominal wage rigidity constraint bind, leading to a persistent recession, such as the Japanese lost decades.