A Behavioral Model of the Popularity and Regulation of Demandable Liabilities

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Rotemberg, Julio J.
• 署名单位: Harvard University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MACROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7707
• DOI: 10.1257/mac.20130143
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 123-152
• 关键词: Bank runs; overconfidence; insurance

摘要

Overoptimism regarding one's ability to arrive early in a queue is shown to rationalize deposit contracts in which people can withdraw their funds on demand even if consumption takes place later. Capitalized institutions serving overoptimistic depositors emerge in equilibrium even if depositors and bank owners have identical preferences and investment opportunities. Consistent with the evidence, runs can lead people to move their deposits from one intermediary to another. Regulatory policies, including deposit insurance, minimum capital requirements and restrictions on the assets held by depository institutions can increase the ex ante welfare of depositors.