The Optimal Conduct of Monetary Policy with Interest on Reserves
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Kashyap, Anil K.; Stein, Jeremy C.
署名单位：
University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research; Harvard University
刊物名称：
AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MACROECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
1945-7707
DOI：
10.1257/mac.4.1.266
发表日期：
2012
页码：
266-282
关键词：
摘要：
In a world with interest on reserves, the central bank has two distinct tools that it can use to raise the short-term policy rate: it can either increase the interest it pays on reserve balances, or it can reduce the quantity of reserves in the system. We argue that by using both of these tools together, and by broadening the scope of reserve requirements, the central bank can simultaneously pursue two objectives: it can manage the inflation-output tradeoff using a Taylor-type rule, and it can regulate the externalities created by socially excessive short-term debt issuance on the part of financial intermediaries.
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