Fighting Crises with Secrecy
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Gorton, Gary; Ordonez, Guillermo
署名单位：
Yale University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Pennsylvania
刊物名称：
AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MACROECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
1945-7707
DOI：
10.1257/mac.20190169
发表日期：
2020
页码：
218-245
关键词：
摘要：
How does central bank lending during a crisis restore confidence? Emergency lending facilities that are opaque (in that names of borrowers are kept secret) raise the perceived average quality of bank assets in the economy, creating an information externality that prevents runs. Stigma (the cost of a bank's participation at the lending facility becoming public) is desirable to implement opacity as an equilibrium outcome, as no bank wants to reveal its participation status. The central bank's key policy instrument for limiting the use of lending facilities while maintaining secrecy is the haircut applied to bank assets used as collateral.
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