Weak States and Steady States: The Dynamics of Fiscal Capacity

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Besley, Timothy; Ilzetzki, Ethan; Persson, Torsten
• 署名单位: University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Stockholm University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MACROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7707
• DOI: 10.1257/mac.5.4.205
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 205-235
• 关键词: taxation; POLICY; GOVERNMENT; INEFFICIENCY; CONFLICT

摘要

Investments in fiscal capacity-economic institutions for tax compliance-are an important feature of economic development. This paper develops a dynamic model to study the evolution of fiscal capacity over time. We contrast a social planner's investment path with politically feasible paths. Three types of states emerge in the long run: a common-interest state where public resources are devoted to public goods, a redistributive state where additional fiscal capacity is used for transfers, and a weak state with no transfers and a low level of public goods provision. We also present some preliminary evidence consistent with the theory.