Ambiguity in partnerships

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kelsey, D; Spanjers, W
• 署名单位: University of Exeter; Kingston University
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2004.00230.x
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 528-546
• 关键词: nonadditive beliefs; moral hazard; expected utility; Nash equilibrium; probability; uncertainty; RISK; preferences

摘要

The consequences of ambiguity for partnerships are addressed. Partnerships with symmetric linear production functions are analysed in a Choquet Expected Utility (CEU)-framework. Nash equilibrium in pure strategies is extended to CEU-games. A class of sharing rules are proposed that make constructive use of strategic ambiguity in partnerships. Results on ex ante efficiency and ex post efficiency of the outcomes are presented.