Strategy similarity and coordination

成果类型:
Article
署名作者:
Sarin, R; Vahid, F
署名单位:
Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; Australian National University
刊物名称:
ECONOMIC JOURNAL
ISSN/ISSBN:
0013-0133
DOI:
10.1111/j.0013-0133.2004.0229a.x
发表日期:
2004
页码:
506-527
关键词:
simple dynamic-model people play games
摘要:
In the payoff assessment model of choice (Sarin and Vahid, 1999), only the assessment of the chosen strategy is updated. We extend that model to allow the agent to also update the assessments of strategies that the agent thinks are similar to the chosen strategy. We use this model to explain observed behaviour in a recent experiment. Statistical tests cannot distinguish between the payoff distributions generated by the model and the observed payoff distributions in almost every period.