BUYER POWER FROM JOINT LISTING DECISION

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Caprice, Stephane; Rey, Patrick
• 署名单位: Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; INRAE; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12241
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 1677-1704
• 关键词: countervailing power; slotting allowances

摘要

We consider a model of vertically related markets, in which an upstream firm faces a competitive fringe of less efficient suppliers and negotiates with customers that compete in a downstream market. We allow downstream firms to form a buyer group which selects suppliers on behalf of its members. We show that transforming individual listing decisions into a joint listing decision makes delisting less harmful for a group member, which in turn enhances the group members' bargaining position at the expense of the upstream firm. We also discuss the implication for upstream investment incentives.