BONUSES AND PROMOTION TOURNAMENTS: THEORY AND EVIDENCE

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ekinci, Emre; Kauhanen, Antti; Waldman, Michael
• 署名单位: Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; University of Jyvaskyla; Cornell University
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12631
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 2342-2389
• 关键词: task-specific experience; comparative advantage; career concerns; wage policy; COMPENSATION; incentives; PRODUCTIVITY; performance; DYNAMICS; firm

摘要

Standard models of promotion tournaments do not distinguish between wages and bonuses and thus cannot explain variation in the use of bonuses. We combine classic and market-based tournament theories to develop a model in which wages and bonuses serve distinctly different roles. We use this model to derive testable predictions which we test employing both a single firm data set and a data set encompassing a large segment of the Finnish economy. Our empirical analysis supports the testable predictions and shows that our theoretical approach better matches the data than alternative theories of bonus determination based on arguments already in the literature.