ARE DONORS AFRAID OF CORE COSTS? ECONOMIES OF SCALE AND CONTESTABILITY IN CHARITY MARKETS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Perroni, Carlo; Pogrebna, Ganna; Sandford, Sarah; Scharf, Kimberley
• 署名单位: University of Warwick; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; University of Birmingham; Alan Turing Institute; ESSEC Business School; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1093/ej/uez006
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 2608-2636
• 关键词: coordination; COMPETITION; provision; Donations

摘要

We study contestability in charity markets where non-commercial, not-for-profit providers supply a homogeneous collective good through increasing-returns-to-scale technologies. Unlike in the case of for-profit competition, the absence of price-based sales contracts for charities means that fixed costs can translate into entry barriers, protecting the position of an inefficient incumbent; or, conversely, they can make it possible for inefficient newcomers to contest the position of a more efficient incumbent. Evidence from laboratory experiments show that fixed-cost driven tradeoffs between efficiency and perceived risk can lead to inefficient technology adoption.