ELICITING AND AGGREGATING INFORMATION BY SORTITION IN COLLECTIVE CHOICE

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Saran, Rene; Tumennasan, Norovsambuu
• 署名单位: University System of Ohio; University of Cincinnati; Yale NUS College; Dalhousie University
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12616
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 1924-1952
• 关键词: Implementation

摘要

We study the effectiveness of sortition to elicit and aggregate information that is dispersed among groups of individuals facing a collective choice problem. Sortition is the process of selecting decision-makers by a kleroterion (lottery machine). In environments with private consumption, we identify a large class of kleroteria that is as effective as direct democracy in (fully) implementing social choice functions. Examples include an opinion poll, where a random sample of two (or more) individuals are selected from each group, and 'oligarchy with random audit', where the group leaders are 'audited' by a randomly selected individual.