LOW RESERVE PRICES IN AUCTIONS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hu, Audrey; Matthews, Steven A.; Zou, Liang
• 署名单位: City University of Hong Kong; University of Pennsylvania; University of Amsterdam
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1093/ej/uez004
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 2563-2580
• 关键词: risk-aversion; equilibrium

摘要

A standard result in auction theory is that a seller's profit-maximising reserve price is no less than his own value for the good. In practice, however, reserve prices often appear to be less than sellers' values. This article revisits the theory of optimal reserves in the context of second-price auctions. The main result is that an optimal reserve is less than the seller's value if the bidders are sufficiently risk averse and if their values are sufficiently interdependent. The resulting outcome may approximate that of an auction without reserve, i.e., an absolute auction.