MOTIVATING KNOWLEDGE AGENTS: CAN INCENTIVE PAY OVERCOME SOCIAL DISTANCE?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Berg, Erlend; Ghatak, Maitreesh; Manjula, R.; Rajasekhar, D.; Roy, Sanchari
• 署名单位: University of Bristol; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of London; King's College London
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12544
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 110-142
• 关键词: performance pay; public-goods; education; work

摘要

This article studies the interaction of incentive pay with intrinsic motivation and social distance. We analyse theoretically as well as empirically the effect of incentive pay when agents have not only pro-social objectives but also preferences over dealing with one social group relative to another. In a randomised field experiment undertaken across 1151 villages in South India, local agents were hired to spread information about a public health insurance programme. In the absence of incentive pay, social distance impedes the flow of information. Incentive pay increases overall agent effort and appeals to cancel the negative effects of social distance.