ACCOUNTABILITY WITH LARGE ELECTORATES

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Aytimur, R. Emre; Bruns, Christian
• 署名单位: University of Manchester; University of Gottingen
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12618
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 1529-1560
• 关键词: voting-behavior; INFORMATION; voters; overconfidence; aggregation; rationality; politicians; bureaucrats; ELECTIONS; media

摘要

We show that ignorant voters can succeed in establishing high levels of electoral accountability. In our model, an incumbent politician is confronted with a large number of voters who receive fuzzy private signals about her performance. A sampling effect enables the incumbent to form a precise estimate of the median voter's signal, and the resulting level of accountability is as if the incumbent faced a perfectly informed social planner. Public information or ideological preferences can impair the beneficial impact of the sampling effect on accountability; overconfidence of voters can restore the full benefit of the sampling effect.