TARGET SETTING IN TOURNAMENTS: THEORY AND EVIDENCE FROM CHINA

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Li, Xing; Liu, Chong; Weng, Xi; Zhou, Li-An
• 署名单位: Peking University
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1093/ej/uez018
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 2888-2915
• 关键词: performance; COMPETITION; FEDERALISM; turnover; leaders

摘要

Motivated by the prevalence of economic targets at all levels of territory administration in China, this article proposes a Tullock contest model to study optimal target setting in a multi-layered tournament-based organisation. In our model, targets are used by upper-level officials to convey the importance of economic growth and incentivise subordinates in the tournaments. Our model predicts a top-down amplification of economic growth targets along the jurisdiction levels, which explains the observed pattern in China. Using both provincial and prefectural-level data, we test the model predictions and find consistent evidence.