Social Value of Public Information in Bargaining
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Basak, Deepal
署名单位：
Indiana University System; IU Kelley School of Business; Indiana University Bloomington; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington
刊物名称：
ECONOMIC JOURNAL
ISSN/ISSBN：
0013-0133
DOI：
10.1093/ej/uead114
发表日期：
2024
页码：
1356-1378
关键词：
摘要：
We consider a bargaining game in which both sides are uncertain about their opponent's commitment, which leads to delay and welfare loss in equilibrium. We address the following question: does ex ante better public information about a player improve expected social welfare? We show that if the information cannot turn the bargaining table (turns the weak bargainer into a strong one and vice versa), more information does not help. More information about a weak bargainer has zero impact, whereas that about the strong bargainer is strictly detrimental. Moreover, by specialising in a binary signal structure, we show that if the information is more accurate in every state, it improves social welfare when it can turn the table.