Corruption and Firm Growth: Evidence from around the World

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fisman, Raymond; Guriev, Sergei; Ioramashvili, Carolin; Plekhanov, Alexander
• 署名单位: Boston University; Boston University; Institut d'Etudes Politiques Paris (Sciences Po); University of Sussex; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; European Bank of Reconstructon & Development
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1093/ej/uead100
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 1494-1516
• 关键词: field experiment; voting-behavior; voter turnout; mobilization; clientelism; CHOICE; media; rise; WILL

摘要

We empirically investigate the relationship between corruption and growth using a firm-level dataset that is unique in scale, covering almost 88,000 firms across 141 economies in 2006-20, with wide-ranging corruption experiences. The scale and detail of our data allow us to explore the corruption-growth relationship at a very local level, within industries in a relatively narrow geography. We report three empirical regularities. First, firms that make zero informal payments tend to grow slower than bribers. Second, this result is driven by non-bribers in high-corruption countries. Third, among bribers, growth is decreasing in the amount of informal payments-in both high- and low-corruption countries. We suggest that this set of results may be reconciled with a simple model in which endogenously determined higher bribe rates lead to lower growth, while non-bribers are often excluded entirely from growth opportunities in high-corruption settings.