Why High Incentives Cause Repugnance: a Framed Field Experiment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Stuber, Robert
• 署名单位: New York University; New York University Abu Dhabi; New York University; New York University Abu Dhabi
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1093/ej/ueae018
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 2580-2620
• 关键词: economics; attitudes; ETHICS; preferences; CHALLENGE; decisions; coercion; kidneys; payment; pay

摘要

Why are high monetary payments prohibited for certain goods, thereby causing shortages in their supply? I conduct (i) a framed field experiment with a general population sample and (ii) a survey experiment with this sample and with ethics committees. In the experiment, participants can prohibit others from being offered money to register as stem-cell donors. I document that, whereas the majority of participants do not respond to changes in the incentives (63%) or become more in favour of the offer with higher incentives (20%), a minority of 17% prohibit high incentives. I show that this minority wants to protect individuals who are persuaded by high incentives. I also show that a lottery scheme reduces their objections to high incentives. Finally, I document that the public is much more supportive of high incentives than are ethics committees.