Making Policies Matter: Voter Responses to Campaign Promises

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cruz, Cesi; Keefer, Philip; Labonne, Julien; Trebbi, Francesco
• 署名单位: University of Oxford; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Inter-American Development Bank; University of Oxford; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1093/ej/ueae008
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 1875-1913
• 关键词: field experiment; electoral accountability; machine politics; clientelism; INFORMATION; turnout; PARTIES; transfers; networks; CHOICE

摘要

Can voters in clientelist countries be swayed by programmatic promises? Results from a structural model and a field experiment disseminating candidate policy platforms in Philippine mayoral elections indicate that they can. Voters who received information about candidate policy promises were more likely to vote for candidates who were closer to their own preferences. Voters who were informed about incumbent candidates' past commitments were more likely to vote for incumbents who fulfilled them. The structural model uncovers mechanisms. Information about campaign promises increases policies' salience relative to other voter concerns; it also affects voter beliefs about candidate quality and candidates' platforms.