Deceptive Features on Platforms

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Johnen, Johannes; Somogyi, Robert
• 署名单位: Universite Catholique Louvain; Budapest University of Technology & Economics; HUN-REN; HUN-REN Centre for Economic & Regional Studies
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1093/ej/ueae016
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 2470-2493
• 关键词: information suppression; shrouded attributes; price; search; COMPETITION; internet; MODEL; obfuscation; ANTITRUST; SALIENCE

摘要

Many products sold on online platforms have additional features like fees for services, shipping, luggage, upgrades, and so on. We study when a two-sided platform shrouds additional features towards potentially naive buyers. We explore a novel mechanism according to which platforms shroud to manipulate network externalities between buyers and sellers. Exploring this mechanism, we argue the advent of online marketplaces led to less transparent markets. First, platforms have stronger incentives to shroud seller fees than sellers themselves. Second, platforms shroud their own fees less if they earn more revenue from sellers; so when sellers on the platform compete more fiercely, platforms-somewhat perversely-shroud more. We connect these results to many applications and the current debate on regulating online platforms.