Constitutions and the resource curse

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Andersen, Jorgen Juel; Aslaksen, Silje
• 署名单位: Norwegian University of Science & Technology (NTNU)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3878
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2007.12.005
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 227-246
• 关键词: growth; political economy; CONSTITUTION; resource curse; institutions

摘要

Utilizing, the fact that natural resources are randomly distributed among countries, we investigate how public income shocks have different long run economic effects dependent on constitutional arrangements. We find that (i) the so-called 'resource curse' is present in democratic presidential countries-but not in democratic parliamentary Countries, (ii) being parliamentary or presidential matters more for the growth effects of natural resources than being democratic or autocratic, and (iii) natural resources are more likely to reduce growth when proportional electoral systems are in place than when the electoral systems are majoritarian. The two first effects appear very robust, the last effect less so. (C) 2007 Elsevier B.V All rights reserved.