Job search and mobility in developing countries. Theory and policy implications

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Zenou, Yves
• 署名单位: Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3878
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2007.06.009
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 336-355
• 关键词: Job matching; Informal sector; policies; Todaro paradox

摘要

A labor market model is developed in which the formal sector is characterized by search frictions whereas the informal sector is competitive. We show that there exists a unique steady-state equilibrium in this dual economy. We then consider different policies financed by a tax on firms' profits. We find that reducing the unemployment benefit or the firms' entry cost in the formal sector induces higher job creation and formal employment, reduces the size of the informal sector but has an ambiguous effect on wages. We also find that an employment/wage subsidy policy and a hiring subsidy policy have different implications. In particular, the former increases the size of the informal sector while the latter decreases it. (C) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.