COSTLY INFORMATION AND SOVEREIGN RISK

成果类型:
Article
署名作者:
Gu, Grace Weishi; Stangebye, Zachary R.
署名单位:
University of California System; University of California Santa Cruz; University of Notre Dame
刊物名称:
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
ISSN/ISSBN:
0020-6598
DOI:
10.1111/iere.12653
发表日期:
2023
页码:
1397-1429
关键词:
time-varying volatility default risk investor attention debt search equilibrium maturity MARKETS prices models
摘要:
The consequences of costly information acquisition for sovereign risk are explored in a quantitative sovereign default model. We identify information costs empirically using Bloomberg news-heat data. The calibrated model microfounds heteroskedasticity in the country risk spread as measured by a novel metric we call the Crisis Volatility Ratio (CVR). Crises are endogenously more volatile because more information is acquired and priced. Recalibrated extant models do not generate CVRs in the empirical range, but ours does. Because effective risk tolerance depends on the information set, the model also suggests that risk premia fall with information costs.