ENTREPRENEUR-INVESTOR INFORMATION DESIGN

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Muratov, Oleg
• 署名单位: University of Bern
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12634
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 1431-1467
• 关键词: Contracts; persuasion; disclosure

摘要

I consider an environment in which an entrepreneur generates information about the quality of his project prior to contracting with an investor. The investor faces a moral-hazard problem since the entrepreneur may divert the funding for private consumption. I find that the efficient amount of information is generated if and only if the bargaining power of the entrepreneur is high enough. I interpret this result in terms of investors' tightness, competitiveness, and generosity measures. I also show that the investor prefers not to have all the bargaining power when the project costs are high enough.