CREDIT, DEFAULT, AND OPTIMAL HEALTH INSURANCE

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Jang, Youngsoo
• 署名单位: University of Queensland; University of Queensland
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12617
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 943-977
• 关键词: reform; RISK; LIFE; INEQUALITY; bankruptcy; mortality; demand; IMPACT

摘要

I study how credit and default affect optimal health insurance, constructing a life-cycle model of health investment with a strategic default option on emergency room bills and financial debts. The model is calibrated to the U.S. economy and used to compare the optimal policy for Medicaid by the availability of the default option and credit. I find that strategic default induces the optimal policy to be more redistributive. With (Without) the option, the optimal income threshold for Medicaid eligibility is 44% (25%) of the average income. In these findings, the interaction between strategic default and preventative medical spending is important.