FIGHTING COLLUSION: AN IMPLEMENTATION THEORY APPROACH

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Azacis, Helmuts; Vida, Peter
• 署名单位: Cardiff University; Corvinus University Budapest; CY Cergy Paris Universite
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12699
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 1821-1850
• 关键词: leniency; PROGRAMS

摘要

A competition authority (CA) has an objective, which specifies what output profile firms need to produce as a function of production costs. These costs change over time and are only known by the firms. The objective is repeatedly implementable if the firms cannot collude and deceive the CA in equilibrium. We identify necessary and sufficient conditions for repeated implementation when firms can only announce prices and quantities. We use these conditions to study when the competitive output is implementable. We extend the analysis to the case when the firms can also supply hard evidence.