SPLITTING THE DIFFERENCE IN INCOMPLETE-INFORMATION BARGAINING: THEORY AND WIDESPREAD EVIDENCE FROM THE FIELD

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Keniston, Daniel; Larsen, Bradley J.; Li, Shengwu; Prescott, J. J.; Silveira, Bernardo S.; Yu, Chuan
• 署名单位: Louisiana State University System; Louisiana State University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Washington University (WUSTL); Harvard University; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Stanford University; Washington University (WUSTL)
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12719
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 1911-1939
• 关键词: ultimatum games; fairness; stakes; BEHAVIOR; axioms

摘要

This article documents a robust pattern from diverse sequential bargaining settings: agents favor offers that split the difference between the previous two offers. Our empirical settings include used cars, insurance claims, home sale, trade tariffs, a TV game show, eBay, and auto-rickshaws. These even-split offers are more likely to be accepted, less likely to spur exit by the opponent, and more likely to be followed by subsequent split-the-difference offers if bargaining continues. We propose several theoretical frameworks to explain this behavior, including an inference argument under which split-the-difference offers can be viewed as an equal split of the potential surplus.