Asymmetric Information, Market Power, and the Underpricing of New Stock Issues in Germany, 1882-1892

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Johns Hopkins University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC HISTORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0507
• DOI: 10.1017/S0022050710000562
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 630-656
• 关键词: initial public offerings; long-run performance; IPO; underwriter; stabilization; reputation; banking; MODEL

摘要

Investors in new stock issues in Germany in the 1880s experienced low spreads between the price they paid for stock and the price at which they could sell the stock in the market. Stock issuing companies paid substantial fees to underwriting banks, and these costs increased with the underwriter's market share. Bank's faced lower issuing costs than did nonfinancial firms. These patterns are consistent with a situation in which underwriters exploited their access to better information (agency problems) and had market power, but do not support the supposed lemons problems that motivated the imposition of stringent regulations in 1896.