Clubs and the market: Large finite economies

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ellickson, B; Grodal, B; Scotchmer, S; Zame, WR
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; University of Copenhagen; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2795
• 发表日期: 2001
• 页码: 40-77
• 关键词: clubs; epsilon-cores; approximate cores; approximate equilibrium; approximate decentralization

摘要

This paper builds a general equilibrium model of finite economics with exchange and club formation. Agents trade multiple private goods snidely in the market, can belong to several clubs, and care about the characteristics of other club members. Because club memberships Lire indivsible and choices of club membership,.,, must be coordinated across the population, the core of such an economy may be empty and equilibrium may not exist. However, for large finite club economics, an approximate core is not empty and states in this approximate core can be approximately decentralized by prices for private goods and for club memberships, The arguments use convexification tools familiar from the literature on private goods economics and a new tool, of some independent interest, that addresses the special problems created by the nature of club memberships. (C) 2001 Academic Press.