Renegotiating moral hazard contracts under limited liability and monotonicity

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Matthews, SA
• 署名单位: University of Pennsylvania
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2000.2726
• 发表日期: 2001
• 页码: 1-29
• 关键词: Moral hazard; RENEGOTIATION; limited liability; debt

摘要

In a principal-agent model H with unobservable effort and possible renegotiation. contracts are assumed to satisfy two natural restrictions: limited liability for the agent and monotonicity of payments for the principal, The main result is that if the agent has the renegotiation bargaining power, any contract is weakly Pareto dominated by a debt contract. (C) 2001 Academic Press.