Efficient strategy-proof exchange and minimum consumption guarantees

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Serizawa, S; Weymark, JA
• 署名单位: Vanderbilt University; Tohoku University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00019-X
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 246-263
• 关键词: Social choice; strategy-proofness; exchange economies

摘要

For exchange economies with classical economic preferences, it is shown that any strategy-proof social choice function that selects Pareto optimal outcomes cannot guarantee everyone a consumption bundle bounded away from the origin. This result demonstrates that there is a fundamental conflict between efficiency and distributional goals in exchange economies if the social choice rule is required to be strategy-proof. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.