Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mishra, Debasis; Parkes, David C.
• 署名单位: Harvard University; Universite Catholique Louvain
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2005.09.004
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 335-366
• 关键词: Combinatorial auctions; multi-item auctions; primal-dual algorithm; universal competitive equilibrium; vickrey auctions

摘要

Ascending price auctions involving a single price path and buyers paying their final bid price cannot achieve the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) outcome in the combinatorial auctions setting. Using a notion called universal competitive equilibrium prices, shown to be necessary and sufficient to achieve the VCG outcome using ascending price auctions, we define a class of ascending price auctions in which buyers bid on a single price path. Truthful bidding by buyers is an ex post Nash equilibrium in such auctions. By giving discounts to buyers from the final price, the VCG outcome is achieved for general valuations. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.