Communication in games of incomplete information: Two players

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Krishna, R. Vijay
• 署名单位: University of Edinburgh
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2005.09.003
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 584-592
• 关键词: Bayesian games; cheap-communication; unmediated communication

摘要

We study the effect of communication in two-person games of incomplete information. We show that for any two-player game of incomplete information, any rational mediated communication mechanism outcome (satisfying a Nash domination condition) can be implemented as the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a cheap-communication extension of the original game. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.