Tit for tat: Foundations of preferences for reciprocity in strategic settings

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Segal, Uzi; Sobel, Joel
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California San Diego; Boston College
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2006.07.003
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 197-216
• 关键词: reciprocity; game theory; extended preferences; representation theorems

摘要

This paper assumes that in addition to conventional preferences over outcomes, players in a strategic environment have preferences over strategies. It provides conditions under which a player's preferences over strategies can be represented as a weighted average of the utility from outcomes of the individual and his opponents. The weight one player places on an opponent's utility from outcomes depends on the players' joint behavior. In this way, the framework is rich enough to describe the behavior of individuals who repay kindness with kindness and meanness with meanness. The paper identifies restrictions that the theory places on rational behavior. (C) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.