The effects of market structure on industry growth: Rivalrous non-excludable capital

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Koulovatianos, Christos; Mirman, Leonard J.
• 署名单位: University of Vienna; University of Virginia
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2005.09.008
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 199-218
• 关键词: Cournot competition; oligopolistic non-cooperative dynamic games; tragedy of the commons

摘要

We analyze imperfect competition in dynamic environments where firms use rivalrous but non-excludable industry-specific capital that is provided exogenously. Capital depreciation depends on utilization, so firms influence the evolution of the capital equipment through more or less intensive supply in the final-goods market. Strategic incentives stein form, (i) a dynamic externality, arising due to the non-excludability of the capital stock, leading firms to compete for its use (rivalry), and, (ii) a market externality, leading to the classic Cournot-type supply competition. Comparing alternative market structures, we isolate the effect of these externalities on strategies and industry growth. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.