Equilibrium in the two-player, k-double auction with affiliated private values

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kadan, Ohad
• 署名单位: Washington University (WUSTL)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2006.06.004
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 495-513
• 关键词: affiliation; Double auction; increasing strategies; private values

摘要

We present sufficient conditions for the existence of an increasing equilibrium in the two-player, k-double auction with affiliated private values. In the case k is an element of {0, 1} there exists a unique equilibrium in non-dominated strategies. Applying this equilibrium, we provide a detailed example illustrating how dependence level affects strategic bidding. In the case k is an element of (0, 1) we prove existence of a continuum of strictly increasing equilibria, and illustrate them using an example. Furthermore, we show that equilibria in the case of independent private values are pointwise limits of equilibria with strictly affiliated private values. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.