Information structures in optimal auctions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bergemann, Dirk; Pesendorfer, Martin
• 署名单位: Yale University; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2007.02.001
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 580-609
• 关键词: Optimal auction; private values; INFORMATION; partitions

摘要

A seller wishes to sell an object to one of multiple bidders. The valuations of the bidders are privately known. We consider the joint design problem in which the seller can decide the accuracy by which bidders learn their valuation and to whom to sell at what price. We establish that optimal information structures in an optimal auction exhibit a number of properties: (i) information structures can be represented by monotone partitions, (ii) the cardinality of each partition is finite, (iii) the partitions are asymmetric across agents. We show that an optimal information structure exists. (c) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.