Coordination of mobile labor

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Steiner, Jakub
• 署名单位: University of Edinburgh
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2007.05.006
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 25-46
• 关键词: coordination; general equilibrium; global games; GLOBALIZATION; industrialization; mobility

摘要

We study coordination failures in many simultaneously occurring coordination problems. Players encounter one of the problems but have the outside option of migrating to one of the remaining ones. Drawing on the global games approach, we show that such a mobile game has a unique equilibrium that allows us to examine comparative statics. The endogeneity of the outside option value and of the migration activity leads to non-monotonicity of welfare with respect to mobility friction; high mobility may hurt players. We apply these general equilibrium findings to the problem of the labor market during industrialization as described by Matsuyama [Increasing returns, industrialization and indeterminacy of equilibrium, Quart. J. Econ. 106 (1991) 617-650]. (C) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.