A dynamic model of settlement

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Koeppl, Thorsten; Monnet, Cyril; Temzelides, Ted
• 署名单位: Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; Queens University - Canada; European Central Bank
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2006.10.005
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 233-246
• 关键词: SETTLEMENT; Payment systems; Random matching; private information; mechanism design

摘要

We investigate the role of settlement in a dynamic model of a payment system where the ability of participants to perform certain welfare-improving transactions is subject to random and unobservable shocks. In the absence of settlement, the full information first-best allocation cannot be supported due to incentive constraints. In contrast, this allocation can be supported if settlement is introduced, provided that it takes place with a sufficiently high frequency. (C) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.