Trees and extensive forms

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Alos-Ferrer, Carlos; Ritzberger, Klaus
• 署名单位: University of Konstanz
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2007.11.002
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 216-250
• 关键词: Extensive forms; trees; Sequential decision theory; differential games

摘要

This paper addresses the question of what it takes to obtain a well-defined extensive form game. Without relying on simplifying finiteness or discreteness assumptions, we characterize the class of game trees for which all pure strategy combinations induce unique outcomes. The generality of the set-up covers exotic cases, like stochastic games or decision problems in continuous time (differential games). We find that the latter class, though a well-defined problem, fails this test. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.