Full revelation of information in Sender-Receiver games of persuasion

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mathis, Jerome
• 署名单位: Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2007.12.002
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 571-584
• 关键词: Disclosure of certifiable information; Partial provability; persuasion; Separating equilibrium; Verifiable types

摘要

We provide necessary and sufficient conditions on both players' preferences and information that can be certified for a Sender-Receiver game to possess a separating equilibrium, as well as sufficient conditions for every equilibrium of such a game to be separating. Accordingly, we generalize Seidmann and Winter's [D.J. Seidmann, E. Winter, Strategic information transmission with verifiable messages, Econometrica 65 (1997) 163-170] results to games with partial provability. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.