Long persuasion games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Forges, Francoise; Koessler, Frederic
• 署名单位: Paris School of Economics; Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2007.02.006
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 1-35
• 关键词: Belief consistency; cheap talk; Diconvexification; Dimartingale; Disclosure of certifiable information; Jointly controlled lotteries; Long conversation; persuasion; Sequential rationality; Verifiable types

摘要

This paper characterizes geometrically the sets of all Nash and perfect Bayesian equilibrium payoffs achievable with unmediated communication in persuasion games, i.e., games with an informed expert and an uninformed decisionmaker in which the expert's information is certifiable. The first equilibrium characterization is provided for unilateral persuasion games, and the second for multistage, bilateral persuasion games. As in Aumann and Hart [R.J. Aumann, S. Hart, Long cheap talk, Econometrica 71 (6) (2003) 1619-1660], we use the concepts of diconvexification and dimartingale. A leading example illustrates both geometric characterizations and shows how the expert, whatever his type, can increase his equilibrium payoff compared to all equilibria of the unilateral persuasion game by delaying information certification. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.