MARKET-SHARE QUOTAS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: REITZES, JD; GRAWE, OR
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/0022-1996(94)90012-4
• 发表日期: 1994
• 页码: 431-447
• 关键词: MARKET SHARE; Quotas; Mixed strategies

摘要

Anecdotal evidence reveals that an import quota is not always filled when the quota is specified in terms of a market-share limit instead of a quantity limit. In a simple Cournot duopoly, we show that imposing a market-share quota eliminates pure-strategy equilibria. Instead, a mixed-strategy equilibrium occurs where the quota is not binding under one of the two equilibrium domestic strategies. Compared with a tariff that restrains the foreign market share to an equivalent level, domestic output (and social welfare) may be higher under a market-share quota.