COST ASYMMETRIES IN INTERNATIONAL SUBSIDY GAMES - SHOULD GOVERNMENTS HELP WINNERS OR LOSERS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: NEARY, JP
• 署名单位: Ulster University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/0022-1996(94)90045-0
• 发表日期: 1994
• 页码: 197-218
• 关键词: STRATEGIC TRADE AND INDUSTRIAL POLICY; Export subsidies; COURNOT AND BERTRAND COMPETITION; learning by doing; perfect equilibrium

摘要

I consider the optimality of export subsidies in oligopolistic markets, when home and foreign firms have different costs and the social cost of public funds exceeds unity. Subsidies are optimal only for surprisingly low values of the social cost of public funds and, if subsidies are justified, they should be higher the more cost competitive are domestic firms. These results hold under both Cournot and Bertrand competition and in a two-period perfect equilibrium with learning by doing. The results suggest that recent arguments for export subsidies are more applicable to firms which possess a 'comparative advantage in profit shifting'.