On the optimality of optimal income taxation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bierbrauer, Felix J.
• 署名单位: University of Cologne
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2011.05.008
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 2105-2116
• 关键词: Optimal income taxation; mechanism design

摘要

The Mirrleesian model of income taxation restricts attention to simple allocation mechanism with no strategic interdependence, i.e., the optimal labor supply of any one individual does not depend on the labor supply of others. It has been argued by Piketty (2009) [121 that this restriction is substantial because more sophisticated mechanisms can reach first-best allocations that are out of reach with simple mechanisms. In this paper, we assess the validity of Piketty's critique in an independent private values model. As a main result, we show that the optimal sophisticated mechanism is a simple mechanism, or, equivalently, a Mirrleesian income tax system. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.