OPTIMAL INDUSTRIAL TARGETING WITH UNKNOWN LEARNING-BY-DOING

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: DINOPOULOS, E; LEWIS, TR; SAPPINGTON, DEM
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/0022-1996(94)01349-W
• 发表日期: 1995
• 页码: 275-295
• 关键词: industrial policy; learning-by-doing; PROTECTION; asymmetric information

摘要

We examine a government's optimal targeting policy when it has limited information about the learning curves of domestic producers. Popular arguments suggest that in order to promote learning-by-doing, the government might want to protect domestic producers from foreign competition by temporarily closing the domestic market to foreign producers. We identify a set of conditions under which such trade intervention is not optimal. Instead, domestic welfare is better fostered either by no government intervention, or by providing subsidies to the most capable domestic producers who are willing to set a particularly low domestic price for their product.