Kidney exchange: An egalitarian mechanism

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Yilmaz, Ozgur
• 署名单位: Koc University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2010.10.018
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 592-618
• 关键词: Mechanism design; matching; kidney exchange; random assignment; Lorenz dominance

摘要

Kidney exchange programs utilize both deceased-donor and live-donor kidneys. One of these programs, a two-way kidney paired donation (KPD), involves two patients exchanging their live donors' kidneys. Another possibility is a list exchange (LE): a living incompatible donor provides a kidney to a candidate on the deceased-donor waitlist and in return the intended recipient of this donor receives a priority on the waitlist. By taking into consideration the fact that transplants from live donors have a higher chance of success than those from cadavers, we characterize the set of efficient and egalitarian exchanges involving the KPD's and LE's. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.