Strategic R&D policy and appropriability

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Miyagiwa, K; Ohno, Y
• 署名单位: Oregon State University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/S0022-1996(96)01448-1
• 发表日期: 1997
• 页码: 125-148
• 关键词: R&D subsidy; INNOVATION; Strategic trade policy; patent length; appropriability

摘要

The Spencer-Brander argument for strategic R&D policy (Review of Economic Studies, 1983, 50, 702-722) is re-examined within an intertemporal model of stochastic innovation. It is shown that an optimal policy is independent of the choice of strategic variables in product market competition but sensitive to the appropriability of the new technology. At low or high degrees of appropriability R&D taxes are an optimal policy but at intermediate degrees R&D subsidies may be optimal. The paper explains why these results differ from Bagwell and Staiger's finding (International Economic Review:, 1992, 33, 795-816; Journal of International Economics, 1994, 36, 133-150) that R&D subsidies are an optimal policy in the presence of uncertainty. (C) 1997 Elsevier Science B.V.